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INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO NATIONAL PUBLIC
PLANNING FOR FOREST RESOURCES:
THE RESOURCES PLANNING ACT
HANNA J. CORTNER* and DENNIS L. SCHWEITZER**
PLANNING EXPECTATIONS AND RESULTS
During the last 15 years, there has been a strong trend in the United
States toward centrally controlled long range planning for publicly
owned forest resources. The first legal mandate for such planning at
the national level occurred in 1974 with the passage of the Forest
and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA). 1 This act
requires that the United States Forest Service make periodic national
assessments of the current and expected resource situation on all of
the nation's approximately 1.6 billion acres of forest and range lands,
and that the agency prepare national plans of work to guide its own
management, research, and cooperative activities. The senate report
on the act summarized the intent of Congress. Each of the periodic
reports that was to be submitted to Congress would include "[a] n
analysis of the present situation, of how things came to be as they
are, and what the outlook may be as to where the present course will
take the nation. Beyond that, it will display the opportunities for the
future, and what measures will be required to realize those opportu-
nities." 2 In addition, there was to be developed a "comprehensive
picture of the sum of public and private activities and expectations."I
Given this information, it was presumed that the combination of fed-
eral, state, and private sector activities that would take place in the
future would best meet the nation's needs for forest resources.
The scope of the Resources Planning Act was further extended in
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**Research Forest Economist, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain & Range Experi-
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1. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § § 581h, 1601-1610 (1976)),as amended by 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949. This was one result of an evolutionary process that also
produced the Budget Control Act and several legislative attempts to introduce national eco-
nomic planning.
2. S. Rep. No. 686, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1974).
3. Id. at 11.
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1976 by passage of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).4
Technically an amendment to RPA, NFMA requires that the Forest
Service also prepare comprehensive plans for each administrative unit
in the 187 million acres of the National Forest System.' NFMA and
its implementing regulations6 are thus designed to link the planning
and budget allocations at the forest and regional levels to the national
planning, programming, and budgeting activities mandated by RPA.
In terms of geographic area, ecological complexities, and interac-
tions between social and physical systems, the challenge posed by the
Resources Planning Act and its sequent act NFMA has no precedent,
at least in the western hemisphere. We believe it has no precedent at
all in terms of the scale of public involvement and requirements for
the full public documentation of rationales, the bases for decisions,
and the decision processes themselves. Although other agencies have
national planning responsibilities and although there is a long tradi-
tion of detailed planning at the project level in the water resources
field, in no other instance is there a statutory requirement to plan
and carry out a long range multiresource program in the context of
national resource and environmental needs.'
The type of national public planning for forest resources repre-
sented by RPA/NFMA attempts to assure an orderly progression to-
ward objectives derived from a rational and comprehensive assessment
of a desired future. That is, in the idealized rational and comprehen-
sive model of the professional planner which is legislatively endorsed
by RPA/NFMA, planning is a process in which objective estimates of
truth are presented as a basis for decisions about what kind of future
resource situation the nation will have so that a series of reasoned ac-
tions can then be deliberately taken to assure that the desired change
occurs. Implicit in this type of planning are assumptions that it is
possible to (1) define the current situation in terms of land capabili-
ties and societal preferences for goods and services; (2) define what
the future will be under alternative courses of events; (3) discriminate
among those alternative futures in terms of relative desirability; and
(4) control events well enough to lead toward a relatively desirable
future. These assumptions are most likely to be satisfied under cir-
cumstances where (1) a complete and accurate understanding of the
present situation exists; (2) the future of concern is short term; (3)
4. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § § 581h, 1601-1614. (1976)).
5. Id. § 6, 90 Stat. 2952 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(c)-(m) (1976)).
6. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,983 (1979) (to be codified in 36 C.F.R. § 219).
7. Telephone interview with Prof. Frank J. Convery, School of Forestry, Duke Univer-
sity, Durham, N.C. (May 8, 1980).
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the criterion of desirability is obvious and simple to apply; and (4)
events can be tightly controlled.
Unfortunately, these circumstances do not characterize public
planning for forest resource production and management. Applying a
rational, comprehensive model to an uncertain and uncontrollable
world creates a situation which can lead to the development of un-
realistic plans and the raising of expectations about what planning
can actually achieve.
Planning promises (or leads us to expect) better decisions, a more
systematic and informed decision process, and the ability to identify
and implement comprehensive and integrated solutions to multifac-
eted, long term national resource problems.' Decisionmaking, and
consequently management, will be more rational and efficient, it is
argued, because it is future oriented, based on more accurate infor-
mation, on improved technical and analytical aids for analysis, and
on reason and logic rather than emotion and self interest.9 Past pat-
terns of piecemeal and fragmented decisionmaking will be replaced
with a systematic and integrated approach.
Many of these expectations probably will not be realized. It is
likely that decisionmaking still will be characterized by constrained
objectiveness and incremental analysis, and that decisionmakers will
continue to "muddle through," changing policy direction as new
knowledge becomes available and circumstances change." ° Decisions
frequently may be based on factors totally unrelated to the planning
analysis.' 1 Moreover, requirements that all planning include coordi-
nation with other governmental units and be responsive to public in-
volvement suggest that "logical" results will be adjusted at each level
of planning.' 2 Decisionmaking will probably neither be more rational
nor easier. It may not even be better.
There are also significant costs potentially associated with national
public planning programs for forest resources. Scarce resources-time,
tax dollars, expertise-may be wasted if an agency's attention moves
away from field operations and toward the generation of voluminous
8. For discussion of the expected benefits of RPA, see S.R. No. 93-686, supra note 2.
9. Roberts, Principles of Land Use Planning, in PLANNING THE USES AND MANAGE-
MENT OF LAND 47, 48-49 (M. Beatty, G. Petersen, & L. Swindale eds. 1979).
10. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, THE STRATEGY OF DECISION 61-143
(1963); Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADM. REV. 517 (1979).
11. B. ACKERMAN, S ' .:-ZMMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCER-
TAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 190-207 (1974). See also A. WIL-
DAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANAL-
YSIS (1979).
12. Culhane & Friesema, Land Use Planning for the Public Lands, 19 NAT. RES. J. 43,
72-73 (1979).
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planning documents and stacks of computer printouts with little
value to anyone.1" The low morale such fruitless planning efforts
create can spread throughout an agency and affect the conduct of
other agency programs. Faulty planning may also skew planning re-
sults and lead to choices that may be far from socially optimal in the
long run, or that may harm the very forest resources planning was in-
tended to protect.14 Unnecessary and nonproductive political contro-
versy may also be generated, especially since any failure to achieve
planned objectives and output targets has a tendency to become ipso
facto evidence of inadequate forest planning and management., '
In the remainder of this paper, we examine why national public
forest planning is likely to encounter difficulties in living up to fre-
quently expressed expectations. While any planning for forest re-
sources must deal with numerous technical difficulties, we are only
incidentally concerned with traditional technical problems such as
those related to inventory and analysis. Our focus is on the particular
institutional factors inherent in national public forest planning that
influence agency perceptions of, and responses to, the charge to con-
duct national public planning. We hope to alert planners to possible
pitfalls and contribute to the development of a more realistic under-
standing of what can be expected from public planning.
While we purposely focus only on the problems of planning, our
intent is not to negate the value of planning. We believe that the true
advantages of any planning endeavor can only be captured if we cast
aside false hopes and begin to acknowledge and understand the limi-
tations imposed by the institutional context in which such planning
occurs. Moreover, we do not suggest that there is anything abnormal
or wicked about the way the planning agency, the Forest Service,
deals with its specific RPA planning mandates, for any agency charged
with such a complex planning task would find itself faced with simi-
lar problems.
Since there are very few instances where we have specific empirical
or experiential evidence that defines what the Forest Service will do
or has done in regard to its RPA planning charge, our approach is to
first define the specific planning situation of the Forest Service and
then to see what the general literature on administrative behavior and
planning has to say about what is likely to happen in generally similar
13. S. Fairfax, RPA and the Forest Service (Spring 1980) (unpublished paper prepared
for the Conservation Foundation's Institutes on RPA, Washington, D.C.).
14. See generally A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 11.
15. Notwithstanding legal and political attempts to link improved public forest resource
planning to improved forest management, there is no empirical evidence that a cause-effect
relationship exists.
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situations. Accordingly, we first briefly review the general tasks re-
quired to complete the RPA planning process. We then discuss the
kinds of factors that are likely to hinder the development of an ade-
quate basis for preparing such plans. We categorize these factors as
(1) those inherent in the bureaucratic and political context in which
national public forest planning takes place; and (2) those arising from
the shared perceptions and traditions of the foresters who largely
comprise agency planning teams.
THE RPA PLANNING PROCESS
Each of the periodic national assessments of RPA is supposed to
provide a picture of the present and prospective situation regarding
all of the nation's forest and range resources. Specifically required are
definitions of national needs, the prospective ability to meet those
needs, and actions that could be taken to better meet those needs.
Within this context, a set of national goals and a national program of
work for the Forest Service are to be defined. Plans for administrative
regions and individual forests are to be subsequently formed by
weaving together the national goals and program with local needs and
preferences.
The major specific steps in the national public planning process are
(1) defining national goals or directions for forest and range resources;
(2) defining alternative Forest Service programs of management on
the national forests, programs of research, and programs to assist
other forestry sectors; (3) selecting and implementing a single plan for
each Forest Service program area; and (4) monitoring the results of
implementation and, when appropriate, beginning a new planning
cycle. The entire process is iterative and continuous. Information con-
cerning resource production capabilities and specific decisions is con-
tinuously exchanged among hierarchical levels, and analyses and deci-
sions are continuously made at each level.' 6 The planning steps at
each level are conceptually the same; they differ primarily in respect
to the level of detail and geographic specificity.
Defining National Goals and Directions
Planning requires the ability to decide what kind of future is most
desirable so that the necessary steps can be taken to get there. Making
the decisions on where the nation should go requires defining the con-
sequences of alternatives in a credible manner and reaching agreement
16. This implies that there will never be a simultaneous solution to planning at all levels;
there will always be a sequencing "problem."
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among the often conflicting desires of a variety of interest groups. In
part, this process was institutionalized through implementation of
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 1 ' and by require-
ments for extensive public involvement in decisionmaking.
Defining Alternative Forest Service Programs" 8
This step first requires representing the real world by an abstract
set of data which can be manipulated so that inferences can be drawn
about the nation's ability to produce goods and services from forest
lands. Based on current understanding of existing constraints on
potential production activities, such as those imposed by minimum
resource protection standards, alternative sets of production possibil-
ities are defined. Either one set of assumptions about the future is
made and then alternatives generated to correspond to that set, or
several sets of assumptions about alternative futures and plan alterna-
tives for each set are developed 9 Whatever approach is used, current
legal requirements specify that a wide range of fully feasible alterna-
tives be included, each promising a different mix of goods and ser-
vices. 2 0
Intertwined with these largely technical tasks is the political-
philosophical task of defining the appropriate role of the national
public sector. Given a particular national goal, what should be the
Forest Service's responsibility, as contrasted with the responsibilities
of other public sectors and the private sector? In the United States,
the appropriate level of public intervention in the market place is a
particularly thorny issue.
Implementing a Forest Service Program
Each alternative is evaluated by an imposing array of biological,
economic, social, and environmental criteria to estimate its implica-
17. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976).
18. Up to now, only the programs of the Forest Service have been directly tied to the
national assessments of the nation's current and future forest situation. It seems likely that
the action programs of other national public agencies affecting those resources eventually
will be linked to those assessments.
19. There are problems with either approach. Planning for electrical energy, for example,
used to extrapolate present consumption patterns into the future. To assure that customer
demand increased sufficiently to utilize the increased supply capability, heavy investments
were made in advertising and in reduced prices for heavy usage. The energy crisis of the mid-
1970s brought these planning methods increasingly into question and they were eventually
defined as part of the energy problem. It is not unimaginable that similar forecasting by pro-
jection for forest resources could lead to a similar result. Building alternative futures, how-
ever, presents no fewer problems. In addition to problems we discuss later, there are techni-
cal limitations on the number of variables that can be included in any future scenario before
it becomes unmanageable.
20. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,987 (1979) (to be codified in 36 C.F.R. § 219.5(0).
[Vol. 21
THE RESOURCES PLANNING ACT
tions. Extensive technical and public reviews form the basis for revi-
sions, selection, and implementation. While the image of dusty plans
on unreachable shelves is all too familiar, the act intends Forest Ser-
vice plans to fit neatly into the budgeting and decisionmaking struc-
ture of the agency. Indeed, each plan is a decision document; it is
ultimately the manager's product and can be viewed as his or her con-
tract with the agency as well as the agency's contract with the public.
Monitoring and Replanning
At the level of the individual forest, continuous monitoring of re-
sults is used to ensure that minimum standards are not being violated
and that plan implementation is proceeding as intended. Whenever
significant problems arise, adjustments are made or replanning is ini-
tiated.2 While replanning is expensive, it provides opportunities to
rectify errors of implementation and to adjust planning for changing
values and improved technical information. By law, RPA plans are
updated every five years.
While monitoring can point up specific problems and replanning
can correct them, neither activity can provide a satisfactory basis for
judging the feasibility of a particular plan. Because most objectives
are to be reached many years in the future, they will frequently be
modified in subsequent planning cycles. Therefore, it is seldom pos-
sible to judge a plan by whether or not its objectives are, in fact, ever
met.2 2 Instead, the realism or success of a plan must be judged on
the basis of whether credible progress toward those goals is being
made.
Having completed our brief review of the planning process, our
discussion now turns to the institutional factors which impose limita-
tions on the planning process. We begin by examining limitations in-
herent in the bureaucratic context in which planning occurs. We then
focus on limitations which can arise from the nature of the shared
perceptions and traditions of foresters in the planning agency.
21. This process gives rise to the argument that the accuracy of long range planning is
not critical, for errors will be periodically corrected; that is, the propriety of expenditures
might not be particularly sensitive to such plans. Verification of this assertion would require
determining the wastage of expenditures and incurred opportunity costs in both public and
private sectors due to faulty planning projections and assumptions. There could also be a
loss of credibility of the planning process and of the planning agency.
22. In the absence of accomplishments by which to evaluate planning, the usual way of
justifying formal planning is to shift the discussion to the beneficial effects of the processes
through which planning is done. Subjective judgments of process and effort replace empiri-
cal measures of products. Moreover, because objectives are changed as basic information and
circumstances change, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish planning from the pro-
cesses of ad hoc decisionmaking it was supposed to supplant. See Wildavsky, If Planning is
Everything, Maybe It's Nothing, 4 POL'Y SCI. 127 (1973).
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THE BUREAUCRATIC CONTEXT OF NATIONAL PUBLIC
FOREST RESOURCE PLANNING
The behavior of any public bureaucracy is influenced not only by
the formal rules, laws, and regulations which constitute its basic mis-
sion, but also by the internal goals and informal rules the organiza-
tion has established to secure its own institutional survival, maintain
its political hegemony, and protect its organizational autonomy. A
first and fundamental source of such bureaucratic survival is an
agency's ability to attract and maintain outside political support.2
The organizational equilibrium each agency develops over time by
balancing the demands of its support groups with its own internal
needs provides important opportunities for the bureaucratic entrepre-
neur and at the same time imposes significant constraints. Planning
cannot escape becoming enmeshed in the push and pull of the larger
bureaucratic environment within which it must operate. The impera-
tives of organizational behavior in the context of national political
and bureaucratic processes constrain the number and nature of the
assumptions and alternatives that are included in the planning analy-
sis, and affect how the agency views the process and results of plan-
ning.
Limits on Planning Assumptions
No agency can serve everyone or provide benefits equally to every-
one. Rather, each agency serves its own set of clientele, and its pro-
grams are of greater benefit to those groups and individuals than to
others. Because substantial social and individual costs may be imposed
upon those who are not program beneficiaries, agencies are hard put
to make a candid public accounting of the costs and benefits of their
programs to different segments of society. Politically, they must act
as if what is done and proposed has a generalizable net public benefit,
just as interest groups must couch their demands in terms of "the
public interest."' ' Open and frank discussions of the external social
and political factors most likely to affect the agency's ability to im-
plement proposed plans and programs may alienate agency support
23. F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 11 (1969).
24. Friesema & Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics and the Environmental Impact State-
ment Process, 16 NAT. RES. J. 339, 348 (1976). Helen Ingram and Joyotpaul Chaudhuri
put the matter bluntly: "The tendency in natural resources policy is to gloss over injustices
and to minimize adverse effects-or to pretend that these things do not exist ... natural re-
sources policy-makers have been blind to the indirect implications of their acts and, there-
fore, have often been insensitive and inhumane." H. Ingram & J. Chaudhuri, The Concept of
Equity and Its Expression in Natural Resources Policy (unpublished paper, Department of
Political Science, University of Arizona). As the authors note, this tendency is reflected in
the reliance upon efficiency analyses and the near neglect of equity analyses.
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groups as well as mobilize critics. To avoid generating new controver-
sies, or further aggravating old controversies, such factors seldom ap-
pear in the planning analysis. The very fact that planning is a public
process, that is, open, is sufficient to guarantee that its content will
differ dramatically from what would be possible in a private, confi-
dential plan.2 S
Because planning by a public agency will also be taken as the pos-
ture of the national administration, it may not be possible for the
agency to consider seriously the possibility of certain future situa-
tions.2 6 For example, although possible changes in legal institutions,
reversals in international relations, or failures of current employment
or monetary policies all may significantly change public demands and
preferences in regard to resource allocations and use, a full airing of
the implications might be far too sensitive to discuss publicly. It is
thus not surprising that most assumptions about future conditions
are positive and growth oriented.
Moreover, any program of work that would lead-even in the dis-
tant future-to a significant change in the balance of resource outputs
would create immediate political confrontations among various re-
source advocates. Typically, a carefully cultivated set of constituency-
agency-congressional committee relationships surround agency pro-
grams.' ' Modifications which threaten to disturb those relationships
or the vital stake each participant has in its favored program are likely
to be strongly resisted. Hence to avoid political turmoil, agencies pro-
ject the future as stable and manageable, and present the case that
continuation of ongoing activities will ensure or increase the desirabil-
ity of the future.2 8
The dollars spent by the federal government in the United States
on forestry matters amount to less than one-half of one percent of
the total federal budget, or a small percent of the federal discretionary
budget. As a consequence, the planning agency has little leverage on-
indeed, may not command enough resources or political leverage to
be fully aware of-current and prospective programs intended to in-
25. Scott, National Economics Planning, in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: GOVERN-
MENT'S NEED TO KNOW 212, 218 (H. Goldschmid ed. 1979).
26. Id. at 220-22.
27. Theodore Lowi terms these relationships self-governing triangular units because the
relationships form a system that has a vigorous capacity to maintain itself and to isolate its
decisionmaking autonomy from outside scrutiny. See T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERAL-
ISM 74-75 (1979). See also Lowi, How the Farmers Get What They Want, 11 THE RE-
PORTER 34 (1954).
28. It has been postulated that in addition to seeking to maximize budgets, multi-product
public agencies such as the Forest Service over invest in projects having distant payouts and
seek to supply an ever widening variety of services desired by separate clienteles. See W.
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 106-12 (1971).
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fluence other significant sectors of the economy. When this factor is
added to the usual array of technical problems, planning assumptions
about the efficacy of future agency programs become especially ten-
uous. When they deal with the future of international trade in forest
products or center upon the likely responses of nonforestry sectors to
the traditional listing of possible forest centered public programs, they
approach sheer speculation. The inability to anticipate or control a
host of exogenous variables outside the agency's own bureaucratic
policy system means arbitrary boundaries must be placed on the fac-
tors included in the planning analysis.
Limits on Planning Alternatives
Agencies are also reluctant to discuss program alternatives that fall
outside their jurisdictional boundaries. While NEPA and the Council
on Environmental Quality's regulations for the preparation of envi-
ronmental impact statements require agencies to include in their plans
and analyses a wide range of alternatives, including a "no-action"
alternative, 2 9 any agency is reluctant to give serious consideration to
alternatives having little relationship to its own goals and programs.30
As a competitor with other agencies for scarce budget dollars, an
agency also may be loath to propose solutions to issues which would
benefit a sister agency at its own expense. Even if most of the feasible
alternatives fall within the agency's general areas of expertise and re-
sponsibility, traditional solutions are still likely to remain favored
solutions.3 Current program budgets gain political support because
of agency ability to convince others that its traditional programs fully
justify public expenditures.3 2 Changes in direction would bring pre-
vious justifications into doubt and lose hard won credibility and
clientele. 3 3
Because a no-action or even a status-quo alternative could mean
foregoing an increase in budget or giving up a portion of current bud-
get and political support, an agency is particularly reluctant to give
full consideration to such an alternative. It is much more appealing to
29. Council on Environmental Quality, Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1978), at § 1502-14.
30. Hill & Ortolano, NEPA 's Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test,
18 NAT. RES. J. 285, 296 (1978).
31. Id. at 309.
32. See generally A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
(2d ed. 1974).
33. In a political sense, continuing public agencies do not treat their past expenditures
as sunk costs that are irrelevant when considering future expenditures. Instead those past ex-
penditures are discounted, with their influence shrinking with the passage of time, individual
bureaucrats, and political administrations.
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redefine no-action so it is compatible with agency goals and objec-
tives. For purposes of land management planning, the Forest Service,
for example, defines no-action as "the condition expected to exist in
the future if current management direction would continue un-
changed.' ' The current (generally expanding) trend is the basis for
evaluating alternatives.
Plan alternatives do not challenge current programs, but rather
rationalize current agency enterprises and reflect upward shifts in
program levels and expenditures."5 Unless restrained by efforts of the
administration to match proposed agency program levels with pro-
jected total federal budget priorities, the selected alternative (the plan
or program) may call for activities that will never be funded. At a
minimum, the administration will then find itself in the politically
costly position of having to refute annually the plans of one of its
component agencies.' 6
It is also difficult for planning to shift program priorities within an
agency. Over time, each unit of an agency develops its own internal
goals and objectives and its own political constituency. 7 Because all
units seek to protect their present roles in the organization and to
build expanding roles in influencing the future, planning becomes a
vehicle to "sell" staff programs and to obtain additional visibility and
influence within the organization. Significant reductions in any tradi-
tional area of emphasis can be achieved only at a substantial internal
cost to the agency.
Tension Between Planning and Management
National public planning asks agencies to monitor and evaluate ob-
jectively their programs without regard to current agency commit-
ments to specific policies and organizations.3 8 But programmatic
agencies exist largely to implement programs. To question the very
underpinnings of an agency's raison d'etre strikes at the heart of its
survival as an institution. There is thus an inherent tension built into
agencies which have mandates both to do long range planning and to
carry out basic program missions.
Organizations historically have dealt with the tension between plan-
ning and management by treating planning as a distinct and separate
34. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,987 (1979) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.5(f)(1)(ii).
35. See generally J. NIENABER & A. WILDAVSKY, THE BUDGETING AND EVALUA-
TION OF FEDERAL RECREATION PROGRAMS, OR, MONEY DOESN'T GROW ON
TREES (1973).
36. See generally Gremillion, McKenney & Pyburn, Program Planning in the National
Forest System, 40 PUB. ADM. REV. 226 (1980).
37. See generally A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1976).
38. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 213.
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activity to be completed quickly and put on the shelf so that agency
staff groups can "get back to business." Often a separate "planning
team" is created, isolated from other functional staff units, and set
off in a corner to do "its work." While we believe the Forest Service
is trying with some success to avoid this trap, it remains to be seen
whether organizational structures can be devised to integrate plan-
ning with on-the-ground decisionmaking.
While RPA/NFMA planning dictates that Forest Service managers
play a larger role in the planning process-because plans will now be
legally binding management documents-their participation may well
place limits on the scope and direction of both analyses and proposed
program changes. It is, in the first instance, difficult for managers to
be self-evaluating and to look critically and objectively at the pro-
grams for which they will be held accountable. Hence, objectiveness
may be constrained. Even if managers could evaluate their own pro-
grams and activities objectively, bureaucratic needs for stability would
limit the managers' ability to adopt any major changes in direction. 9
As Aaron Wildavsky has pointed out, the analyst's responsibility to
speak truth to the power of line officers is not easy.4 0
Short Term Political Horizons
While a long term perspective is indeed required to manage forest
resources that may take decades to produce, our political process en-
courages elected decisionmakers to focus on short term problems and
to favor solutions with immediate payoffs and delayed expenditures.
Opting for long term solutions which may not show quick results or
which may impose hardships in the short term requires too enormous
a political risk. To be politically feasible, future benefits must be
heavily discounted compared to current benefits. 4 1 Yet, as we know,
what is feasible in the short run may have detrimental effects in the
long run,4 2 an especially disturbing fact when attempting to plan
39. See generally A. DOWNS, supra note 37; H. KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGA-
NIZATIONAL CHANGE (1971). For a case study of exceptions to these generalizations,
see D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
(1979).
40. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 11, at 321.
41. D. ERVIN, J. FITCH, R. GODWIN, W. SHEPARD & H. STOEVENER, LAND USE
CONTROL: EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 59 (1977). As Nis-
kanen illustrates, continuing agencies try to invest in the future in order to assure continuity.
See W. NISKANEN, supra note 28, at 106-112. Politicians, because of relatively short ten-
ures, want quick payoffs.
42. See generally Forrester, Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems, 2 THEORY &
DECISION 109 (1971).
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management practices whose benefits may not be captured for many
decades.
An additional peculiarity of public forest resource planning in the
United States is that the legally mandated planning schedule is not
synchronized with the timing of presidential elections. National plans
must be completed every five years while Presidents are elected (and
political operatives are appointed) at four-year intervals. Consider:
the 1980 RPA plan was produced in the last year of a presidential
term; the 1985 plan is due as a new presidential term begins; and the
1990 plan is due half-way through a presidential term. While no one
is certain what this will mean in practice, it is likely that some plan
alternatives will be judged infeasible at the last minute (in spite of the
continuing influence of permanent civil service staff), as "feasibility"
is redefined to be consistent with election year practicalities. The
moment of truth for any plan occurs annually in the budgeting pro-
cess, and no administration wants to be locked into long term plans
that were politically negotiated by others. Administrations want flex-
ibility to respond to real but changed needs. They also want flexibility
to shift commitments, or trade program budgets for political sup-
port.4
If it is to be implemented, planning must be politically pragmatic
and consider the short term political horizons of those who ultimately
will determine budget priorities. But pragmatism in the short term
promises to limit the ability of planning to serve as a sound basis for
the development of programs that will resolve long term problems. At
best, it seems clear that political efficacy will limit the analytical in-
tegrity of national public planning for forest resources.
SHARED PROFESSIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND TRADITIONS OF
PUBLIC FORESTERS
The imperatives of organizational maintenance interacting with
factors in the external political environment explain many agency re-
sponses to new policy initiatives. But while bureaucracies do, in a
sense, take on lives of their own that are separate from the actions of
individuals within the organizations, the perspectives and professional
norms shared by agency employees can by no means be overlooked.
They become intertwined in the basic organizational fabric of an
agency, helping to define and explain its role, differentiating it from
other bureaucratic agencies and private organizations, and accounting
43. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 32, at 189.
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for its behavior when confronted with new directives and program
responsibilities.
Because most public foresters, who are responsible for long range
planning in agencies such as the Forest Service, share a similar formal
education, belong to the same professional societies, and share a com-
mon legacy of information and analytical techniques, many of their
perceptions are similar. These shared perspectives, with a long and
rich tradition, have been identified as principal strengths of the Forest
Service as an organization.44 At the same time these perspectives con-
tribute to building a rather insular bureaucracy, and limit agency flex-
ibility to respond to new conditions and to accept innovation.45 Long
range forest planning with its emphasis on issues and public involve-
ment calls for changes in the perspective of foresters of the manner in
which public forest resources are to be managed. These changes must
be accompanied by significant shifts or reversals in organizational be-
havior. To the extent such changes are not achieved, the traditional
orientations and professional characteristics of public foresters can
also be expected to limit the achievement of planning in the short
term.
The Supply Focus
Any intensive planning process requires large quantities of data.
When a charge to do such planning is given to any agency such as the
Forest Service, which has concentrated on supplying goods and ser-
vices for many years, it is natural that attention would be focused on
data regarding the current and potential supplies of resources.
The Resources Planning Act and the National Forest Management
Act, however, are distinctly anthropocentric or demand centered.
The RPA requires comparing potential demands with potential sup-
plies as the rationale or context for formulating national programs of
work. Similarly NFMA requires that plans for individual forests be
issue oriented and that alternatives be designed to resolve issues of
current concern. In brief, demands, rather than supplies, are to drive
planning. Yet foresters have a stronger tradition of being concerned
with the supply side of the supply-demand balance equation.4 6
44. See generally H. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1967).
45. Id. See also G. ROBINSON, THE FOREST SERVICE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC LAND
MANAGEMENT 259-65 (1975).
46. It is philosophically and economically debatable, of course, whether public agencies
should attempt to satisfy all demands. Should the national forests, for example, be used to
meet the nation's demand for gasoline and fuel wood through more intensive wood use for
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The agency's traditional focus on physical supplies of resources has
led to developing inventory techniques from the ground up-that is,
the typical starting point is to define what resources are available. But
when demands change, the questions change, requiring different kinds
of data. Relying on traditional approaches to inventories or focusing
first on trying to capture the holy grail of "answer-everything" data,
instead of on the development of analytical models specifically orien-
ted to demand questions, can lead to problems. Traditional forest in-
ventory techniques, for example, are unable to provide critical infor-
mation about mobile resources, such as water and wildlife.4 ,
To the extent that what is being demanded is incorrectly specified,
estimates of supply capabilities will be wrong. A serious limitation is
introduced by failures to recognize that the desires of people fre-
quently can be satisfied in a variety of ways. Information that some
number of people hunt deer in some location is not an adequate basis
for defining substitute species or experiences or locations that might
serve the hunters as well. Similarly, gathering firewood may well be a
substitute for recreational experiences. Given increasing pressures on
all resources, the ability of the agency to identify equivalent substi-
tutes becomes increasingly important; failures lead to overly restricted
estimates of supply capabilities and, perhaps, to a less-than-optimal
allocation of scarce resources to production.4 8
For public foresters whose professional roots can be traced to a
Germanic tradition in which present conditions of the forest coupled
with an understanding of biological processes and the availability of
budgets defined what should be done, the philosophical and socioeco-
nomic nuances of supply-demand assessments present a new and alien
set of questions. To the extent these are not adequately addressed, it
will be extremely difficult to develop satisfactory rationales for na-
tional programs of work.4 9
energy, or should the diminishing supplies and accelerating costs of oil based energy be
relied upon to induce conservation as an alternative national response to the energy crisis?
In a slightly different vein, to what extent should these national resources be used to alle-
viate unemployment problems in the Pacific Northwest?
47. See generally Hirsch, Krohn, Schweitzer & Thomas, TRends and Needs in Federal In-
ventories of Wildlife Habitat, 44 TRANS. NO. AM. WILDLIFE & NAT. RESOURCES
CONF. 340 (1979).
48. This issue has been addressed elsewhere both by M. H. Krieger, very generally, and
by John Hendee and Rabel Burdge in terms of outdoor recreation. See Hendee & Burge, The
Substitutability Concept: Implications for Recreation Research and Management, 6 JOUR.
LEISURE RESEARCH 157 (1974); Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Tees? 179 SCIENCE
446 (1973).
49. See generally Behan, Political Popularity and Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange
Case of Sustained Yield Forestry, 8 ENVT'L LAW 309 (1978).
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Planning as a Technical, Objective Enterprise
A long history of concentrating on physical resources is probably
responsible for the widely shared belief that inventory and data man-
ipulation activities are objective, value free processes, dependent only
upon sound forestry practices. They are not, of course. Supply-
demand estimates are not only reflections of objective, measurable
phenomena, but also of the socio-political context in which the forest
resource manager operates and of his or her professional and personal
value structure."0 Both explicit and implicit choices are made about
the data and information to be collected. Further choices are made
in choosing the analytical methodologies that will be used to manipu-
late and display the data.
Moreover, whenever constraints to protect sensitive resource con-
ditions are placed on the formulation of alternatives, values enter in.
Both laws (e.g., protect water quality) and administrative fiats (e.g.,
do not cut timber along highways) are translated into prohibitions
against possible management practices. But because adequate empiri-
cal data seldom exist to support such technical translations, collective
judgments are made by interdisciplinary teams and rules of thumb are
defined. These are subject to the vagaries of any decision-by-commit-
tee, including that of being dependent upon the relative power of in-
dividual team members. Excessive prohibitions or safety margins may
lead to underestimates of the potential ability to produce nonpro-
tected resources and result in significant opportunity costs. Too few
prohibitions may lead to plans that cannot be implemented and ob-
jectives that cannot be reached.
To evaluate the tradeoffs among alternative packages of goods and
services, professional foresters must assign values to nonmarket re-
sources. Considering the functional specialization among most for-
estry professionals, it is not surprising that many act as advocates and
insist on relatively high values for their particular resources. The lack
of a strong empirical basis for establishing such values not infrequently
leads to relying on intuition or trying to use as high a value as others
will permit-or at least not vocally contest.5 1
The entire process of developing and evaluating alternatives com-
50. See generally M. LEE, POLITICS AND PLANNING: A NATIONAL STUDY OF
AMERICAN PLANNERS (1979); Mitroff, The Myth of Objectivity or Why Science Needs a
New Psychology of Science, 18 J. MANAGEMENT SCI. B-163 (1972).
51. Given the legal mandate to work in cooperation with a host of functional agencies
and interest groups, establishing acceptable values is extremely difficult. Marion Clawson
notes a similar tendency among those who benefit from the production of non-market re-
sources to exaggerate those benefits. See Clawson, The Concept of Multiple Use Forestry, 8
ENVT'L LAW 281, 296 (1978).
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bines formal technical rules and informal, professional value struc-
tures.' 2 Given the agency's diminishing ability to satisfy all forest
users and the ease of access to federal courts to challenge the basis of
professional criteria and standards, sooner or later many of those val-
ues will have to be defended. To the extent they cannot be defended,
the analytical heart and the credibility of planning can be destroyed.
Decisionmaking as Localized and Decentralized
A strong tradition within the Forest Service speaks to the para-
mount role of local interests and concerns in forestry. Secretary of
Agriculture James Wilson addressed this issue at the establishment of
the Forest Service in 1905. He wrote to Gifford Pinchot, Chief of the
Forest Service: "In the management of each reserve local questions
will be decided upon local grounds.... General principles... can be
successfully applied only when the administration of each reserve is
left largely in the hands of local officers, under the eye of thoroughly
trained and competent supervisors."' To achieve this goal, a decen-
tralized administrative structure with considerable decisionmaking
discretion lodged at the field level was established.
The trend in the past few years, however, has generally been toward
centralized control. National planning and program budgeting are just
two of these centralizing forces.5 4 Yet, despite the intrinsic central-
izing tendencies of RPA/NFMA planning and current direction to the
contrary, many foresters still reaffirm the dogma of decentralization
by perceiving planning as largely a bottom-up activity. National supply
capabilities are perceived as aggregated upwards and national plans
are viewed as largely the sum of individual forest plans. But to the
extent that local plans or locally balanced alternatives could be relied
upon to define national supply capabilities, local rather than national
criteria would drive the planning process. Under these circumstances,
national planning becomes a reporting process rather than a decision
process. While some argue that forest planning decisions should or
must still be made locally, such an approach conflicts with a central
premise of national planning: wherever possible, resources will be
efficiently used to meet national goals because the utilization of
52. Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711,
714 (1978).
53. H. KAUFMAN, supra note 44, at 84.
54. S. Fairfax, supra note 13. On the centralization implicit in rational planning, see
Scott, supra note 25. On the centralization bias of program budgeting, which is a central
feature of RPA and NFMA planning, see Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency:
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, in POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND PUBLIC POLICY 55 (A. Ranney ed. 1968).
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nationally owned resources will be subject to decisionmaking by
elected representatives of all citizens in Washington.' s
Forestry as Nonpolitical
The new long range planning process defined by RPA/NFMA is ex-
plicitly a political process. Requirements for interagency and inter-
governmental coordination to determine shares of responsibility, and
for public involvement to ensure that societal demands and prefer-
ences are considered, assure that political influence will enter the
planning and decision processes. National programs and forest plans
will reflect the bargains struck among contending groups during each
step of the planning process. They will also reflect the planner's abil-
ity to deal not only with technical questions of supply-demand and
land conditions, but also with value laden questions of who benefits
and who pays. To deal with the political nuances of long range public
resources planning, political competence as well as technical compe-
tence is required.
Political comptence requires knowing the principal political actors,
their beliefs, values, motivations, the intensity with which they hold
their preferences, the resources they have available to press their de-
mands in the political arena, and possible areas of policy conflict and
consensus. Plan alternatives must be examined to determine how they
affect local values and customs, the prerogatives and jurisdictions of
other governmental units, and the legal and nonlegal relations between
political actors salient to the agency's political survival.' 6 The ability
to achieve pragmatic compromises among divergent views is critical. 7
Political feasibility must be a central decision criterion. More than
just developing technically correct methods of collecting and display-
ing socioeconomic and political information is required-although
that too is important. Learning how to utilize such information in a
55. Efficiency would suggest taking advantage of the comparative advantages of forests
in the production of nationally significant resources; this route would permit a greater total
production than is possible when the production of each forest must be balanced among all
uses. In contrast, "[w] hen efficiency leads to a loss of adaptability, and information leads
to illusions of certainty, and centralization leads to both of these, we have a magnificent de-
sign for extinction." Boulding, Reflections on Planning: The Value of Uncertainty, 77
TECH. REV. 8, 8 (1974).
56. The analytical and practical polkical skills needed to assess the political-institutional
impacts of alternative policy proposals are discussed in Huitt, Political Feasibility, in POLI-
TICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (A. Ranney ed. 1968); Majone, Political Feasi-
bility, in POLICY STUDIES REV. ANNUAL 80 (S. Nagel ed. (1977); and Meltsner, Political
Feasibility and Policy Analysis, 32 PUB. ADM. REV. 859 (1972).
57. Behan, Para-politics and Natural Resources Administration, Or, What to Do While
Waiting for the Sierra Club to Arrive (April 27, 1972) (unpublished paper presented to the
USDA Forest Service Conference on Organizational Improvement, Boise, ID.).
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politically sophisticated manner and relating the nature of politics to
everyday planning and management is essential. For most public for-
esters, this way of proceeding requires a new orientation and perspec-
tive.
Most foresters are trained in and are comfortable with the language
and methods of the physical-biological sciences. But few are familiar
and comfortable with the language and methodologies of the social
sciences and of politics. Problems are often defined in technical terms
when in fact they are political problems requiring political solutions.
Indeed, being political is frequently regarded as inherently distasteful
or in conflict with agency perceptions of professionalism.5 8 The
agency prides itself on its political independence and on the fact that
it has always been headed by up-through-the-ranks professional re-
source managers whose tenures (11 chiefs in 75 years) have trans-
cended the frequent rotations of the political appointees who head
most other agencies. The agency has effectively used its apolitical
posture to gain considerable technical credibility and political clout
and to build a strong professional esprit de corps.
Achieving a new awareness of, and sensitivity to, political factors
and securing the requisite political skills cannot be expected to occur
without significant organizational costs. Yet if the old attitudes and
perceptions persist, the agency will be unable to reap fully the politi-
cal benefits of planning or avoid its political pitfalls. Moreover, lack
of these political skills can increase the likelihood that control of the
planning process will slip from the agency. Planning results, as mea-
sured in terms of programs and budgets, could become overly respon-
sive to special interests and actors better attuned to the exigencies of
the political arena.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Any effective national public planning process requires that an
assessment be made of current land conditions and public prefer-
ences, that a range of futures be projected, that a decision be made
regarding which direction the nation should take, and that it is pos-
sible to influence events to move in that direction. Planning for forest
resources encounters obstacles in all these tasks. In addition to a host
of technical problems, major institutional factors impose significant
constraints. These institutional constraints emanate both from the
bureaucratic context in which planning operates and from the percep-
tions and traditions shared by public foresters in the planning agency.
58. Id.; S. Fairfax,supra note 13.
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We have been concerned with these potential problems in this paper
both because they can lead to unrealistic or less-than-optimal plans
and because those interested in such planning might expect more than
can be delivered.
Few of the problems associated with the bureaucratic context can
be resolved by the planning agency. They are inherent in the warp
and woof of the political system of the United States. This system is
not amenable to strong centralized control. Planning does not follow
a totally satisfying rational model, in part, because it takes place
within the context of a broader, institutional framework that does
not follow such a model.
Perhaps the most important point is that public planning is not a
neutral, objective process. It is, instead, a highly politicized process.
As such, it is likely to be used by various groups to negotiate impor-
tant concessions from the agency, and by the agency to promote and
expand its program base. While the legislatively mandated, rational-
comprehensive model of the professional planner assumes full objec-
tivity and at least admits the possibility of large scale change, the
characteristics of the combined planning-management agency con-
strain objectiveness and limit change to marginal and incremental de-
viations from the current program base. If not explicitly recognized,
the lack of a fit between the theoretical model and the type of RPA
plan that is realistically possible to present to the public can lead to a
distrust of all planning. Then the goals of public national planning
for forest resources will remain elusive and its accomplishments
ephemeral.
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